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Executive Federalism and the Terms of Union: 
A New Approach to Understanding the “Roads-
for-Rails” and “Roads-for-Boats” Agreements
JEFFREY F. COLLINS
INTRODUCTION
This paper introduces the concept of executive federalism to Newfoundland 
and Labrador’s governmental relations with Canada through an examination 
of the 1988 railway and 1997 coastal ferry agreements.1 In doing so it aims to 
add to our understanding not only of contemporary Newfoundland policy- 
making but also of Canadian federalism. Executive federalism is the process of 
policy-making brought about by the interaction of the executive levels of the 
provinces and the federal government. This executive process has long been 
considered one of the defining characteristics of Canadian federalism, and the 
policies that result from such interaction are said to be shaped by Canada’s 
constitutional strictures (Smiley, 1974; Watts, 1989). In the cases to be ana-
lyzed in this paper, the concept of executive federalism will help illustrate how 
the federal government on two occasions made formal arrangements to end its 
involvement in Newfoundland’s railway and the Labrador coastal ferry ser-
vice.2 Moreover, the paper argues that the Terms of Union, the constitutional 
document that governs Newfoundland’s transition into the Canadian federa-
tion and mandated federal involvement in the province’s transportation sys-
tem, helped shape the debate and the subsequent final agreements, known 
colloquially as the “Roads-for-Rails” and “Roads-for-Boats” deals.
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In making this argument this paper will first provide an overview of exec-
utive federalism theory. This summary will be followed by an analysis of the 
Terms of Union, with particular focus on how the document’s interpretation 
helps explain why the agreements reached in 1988 and 1997 were possible. 
Following that are the two case studies: the railway and the coastal ferry ser-
vice. This section of the paper will highlight the main discussions, issues, and 
actors that dominated the discourse leading up to the end of federal involve-
ment in each service and, by default, provide a context for executive federalism 
theory. Finally, there will be an analysis of how these two agreements “fit” into 
executive federalism theory, concluding with what this means for New-
foundland’s remaining, and constitutionally sanctioned, federal-operated 
transportation service, the Port aux Basques–North Sydney ferry. In analyzing 
the province’s railway and coastal ferry agreements this paper represents a first 
in applying executive federalism theory to a Newfoundland case study. Further-
more, it places the province’s railway and ferry services, the former of which has 
received some historical analysis, into a political science perspective that will 
be of interest to both students and practitioners.
ExECUTIVE FEDERALISM
In Canadian political science discourse the transportation initiatives negotiated 
between the two executive branches in 1988 and 1997 can be said to represent 
examples of “executive federalism,” a defining, and indeed dominant, charac-
teristic of Canadian federalism today. At its core, the term simply refers to the 
“direct negotiation[s] between the executives of different governments” (Sim-
eon, 2006: 5; see also Watts, 1989: ix). The emergence of executive federalism 
in Canadian intergovernmental relations owes as much to the lack of a consti-
tutional provision governing federal-provincial interactions as it does to any 
ingenuity on the part of policy-makers (Smiley, 1974: 22; Watts, 1989: 1; 
Bakvis et al., 2009: 104). Specifically, executive federalism reflects Canada’s 
hybrid constitutional model that combines, on one hand, British parliamen-
tary institutions where power is concentrated in a central executive and, at the 
other, an American-style federal structure that disperses power territorially. 
Such a model is said to create ambiguity in federal-provincial relations by not 
providing any role for the provinces in the country’s national political institu-
tions (Smiley, 1974: 15). This leaves Canada’s federal structure with a “low 
level of institutionalization” and consequently creates more “fluidity” in its 
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intergovernmental relations, which allows for both levels of government to 
pursue alternative, and indeed, unscripted avenues for addressing intergov-
ernmental policy concerns (Bakvis et al., 2009: 105; Smiley, 1974: 38-39; 
Watts, 1989: 1; Simeon, 2006: 39). 
In light of this it can be said that Canada’s broader constitutional frame-
work helps shape the outcomes of intergovernmental relations, given that such 
interactions between the provinces and Ottawa “are often attempts to get 
around constitutional strictures.” Furthermore, these “attempts to get around” 
the Constitution can often result in de facto constitutional changes (Simeon, 
2006: 41; see also Bakvis et al., 2009: 103). More importantly, the interaction 
between various constitutional provisions and the policies being advocated by 
one or the other government help “to shape the kinds of issues the govern-
ments negotiate” (Simeon, 2006: 39). For example, in the railway and Labrador 
ferry cases the provisions in the Terms of Union concerning federal involve-
ment in Newfoundland’s transportation sector conflicted with Ottawa’s national 
policy goals, in the first case, to deregulate national railway operations in the 
mid-1980s and, in the second, to rein in the country’s deficit in the 1990s. In 
both cases the province had as its goals a desire to obtain large-sum cash 
payments not only to compensate it for the lost or transferred services but, 
arguably, to assist the province’s dire financial situation (Cadigan, 2009: 272-76). 
Therefore, a perceived benefit of executive federalism is that it allows both gov-
ernments to avoid costly and publicly drawn-out court battles, as well as the 
sometimes cumbersome thrust and parry of elected legislatures and of cau-
cuses. However, the threat of court action still remains the “ultimate weapon” 
should one party fail “to come to an acceptable result through intergovern-
mental bargaining” (Smiley, 1974: 11). And legislatures, when brought in after 
the fact to rubberstamp executive agreements, can become recalcitrant, as 
the Meech Lake experience demonstrated. 
In terms of the actual interaction between federal and provincial execu-
tives, termed “federal-provincial diplomacy” by Richard Simeon (2006), its 
roots are much more recent. What we know today as First Ministers’ Confer-
ences, for example, only became reoccurring events in the 1930s as federal and 
provincial governments came together “to coordinate their responses to the 
Great Depression” (Bakvis et al, 2009: 105). Following World War II, however, 
the federal government became highly involved in such traditional areas of 
provincial jurisdiction as education, health, and social services through the 
provision of financial transfers (ibid.; see also Smiley, 1974: 9). As Canada 
developed into a welfare state, the need to co-ordinate federal and provincial 
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policies and programs led to a “dramatic increase in the frequency of meetings, 
primarily of officials, and the rise of what Donald Smiley terms ‘executive fed-
eralism’” (Bakvis et al., 2009: 105). 
Moreover, as Smiley (1974) notes, additional factors further facilitated the 
growth of executive federalism. For one, there was the emergence of a new 
kind of Québécois nationalism following the election of Premier Jean Lesage in 
1960, which led to a series of constitutional meetings and conferences between 
the country’s premiers and prime minister. Second, there was “the shift in the 
balance of bureaucratic competence to the provinces,” leaving them more 
capable and autonomous in providing services. Third, there was the electoral 
defeat of the long-reigning federal Liberals in 1957, who were succeeded by a 
series of minority governments — one Conservative, others Liberal — following 
the elections of 1957, 1962, 1963, 1965, and 1972. And, finally, there was the 
“failure of the national economic policies from the late 1950s onward to ensure 
adequate conditions of employment and growth” (ibid., 9). All told, “These 
influences . . . led to a situation in which the most crucial aspects of Canadian 
public policy [were] created within the context of federal-provincial negotia-
tion” (ibid., 9). 
Practices within executive federalism have continued to evolve over the 
succeeding decades. The federal government has become “increasingly likely to 
pursue national objectives by way of separate agreements with each of the prov-
inces” rather than provide an opportunity for the 10 provinces to “gang up” on 
it (Bakvis et al., 2009: 116). Regional ministers, once considered to have faded 
into oblivion with the ascent of the Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister in 1968, 
began to make a comeback in the early 1980s. Largely responsible for dispensing 
patronage, leading their party’s provincial organizations, and “influencing 
expenditures affecting their region,” regional ministers such as John Crosbie 
and Brian Tobin were also known for “injecting a regional dimension into 
the delivery of departmental programs.” Crucially, they are also frequently 
tasked with “communicating the decisions and views of the centre to the region 
[and] explaining the less palatable outcomes of Ottawa’s deliberations to pro-
vincial or local constituents and helping ensure that they remain within the 
fold” (Bakvis, 1989: 122). Therefore, federal ministers like Crosbie and Tobin 
served just as much as emissaries of Ottawa to their home province as they did 
as Newfoundland’s representatives at the federal cabinet table. 
Additionally, others have remarked upon the growing concentration of 
power in fewer and fewer individuals within the nation’s executive branch. 
Savoie (1999: 635), for example, suggests that the 1970s up to the Chrétien-era 
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in the 1990s witnessed the growth of “court government” whereby all effective 
power rested with the Prime Minister and his non-elected advisers in the 
PMO. Savoie argues that the PM had become the sole arbiter in federal-provincial 
relations, with regional ministers becoming more sidelined. Cameron and 
Simeon (2002: 49), however, notice that during this same time period execu-
tive federalism became characterized by a set of practices and principles 
termed “collaborative federalism,” meaning that intergovernmental relations 
had morphed into “a partnership between two equal, autonomous, and inter-
dependent orders of government that jointly decide[d] national policy.” This 
move towards collaborative federalism was partly a response to deep federal 
spending cuts in the 1990s, which often led to “secondary downloading” of 
programs to the provinces. Moreover, the overall effect of these actions “was to 
invest the provincial governments with a stronger sense of their autonomy, 
their responsibility, and their right to judge, within their spheres of jurisdic-
tion, what the national as well as the provincial interest requires” (ibid., 54). 
Furthermore, collaborative federalism, like executive federalism generally, 
serves as an “alternative” to constitutional change: “rather than being expressed 
in the uncompromising language of constitutional clauses, and enforced by the 
courts, they are to be expressed as intergovernmental ‘Accords’, ‘Declarations’, 
and ‘Framework Agreements’” (ibid., 55). The legal and political status of such 
intergovernmental agreements remains a key question, particularly in regard 
to their enforcement because, as a principle of constitutional law, one “govern-
ment cannot bind future legislatures” without a constitutional amendment 
(ibid., 62-63; see also Monahan, 1991: 867).
Finally, the process of executive federalism is not above criticism. Many 
discussions and arrangements have occurred out of the public eye with little, if 
any, legislative debate (a prominent example being Prime Minister Brian Mul-
roney’s Meech Lake proposals). This tends to lead to charges of “backroom 
dealings” and “undemocratic arrangements” that allegedly place the interests 
of the involved governments, rather than those of the broader public, at the 
centre of the discussions. In most cases, however, the closed-door arrange-
ments are due to the desire of the involved parties not to “upset the delicate 
deals which have been negotiated” after months of discussions and planning 
(Watts, 1989: 5; Menzies, 2012: 1). The process also receives criticism regard-
ing the absence of decision-making rules and the effect this can have on public 
policy-making generally — essentially, if there is no openness and transparency 
who can be held to account for the policy being agreed upon? (Bakvis et al., 
2009: 127; see also Cameron and Simeon, 2002: 64). Still, as Menzies (2012: 1) 
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records in her observations on executive federalism in Australia, despite the 
“purported ‘anti-democratic’ nature of executive federalism, many critics do 
acknowledge it does have the advantage of enabling rapid decisions to be taken 
and for a broader political accommodation which can be difficult to achieve 
through existing institutions.” Furthermore, the general public has often exhib-
ited “little tolerance . . . for the constraints of constitutional government and 
the expectation from the public is that political leaders will either ignore or 
work around such constraints” (ibid., 2). 
THE TERMS OF UNION
In light of this overview of executive federalism, a constitutional document 
like the Terms of Union can be seen to represent a “constraint” on intergovern-
mental relations between Ottawa and Newfoundland. This is particularly true 
in the sense that, like any constitutional proscription, the Terms of Union can 
govern the overall behaviour and policy development between two govern-
ments (O’Flaherty, 2009: 9). Having been negotiated in 1948 and signed in 
1949, the 50 provisions contained within the Terms of Union laid out “the 
constitutional ground rules within which Newfoundland must operate as a 
Canadian province” (MacKenzie, 1998: 220). Like its 1871 and 1873 British 
Columbia and Prince Edward Island counterparts, respectively, the ultimate 
goal of the 1949 Terms of Union was to turn a self-governing British domin-
ion, Newfoundland, into a Canadian province (ibid., 221). 
Many of the terms within the document illustrate this point quite clearly. 
For example, Term Four guarantees the province six senators and seven mem-
bers of Parliament; Term 41 ensures that all Newfoundlanders and Labrador-
ians, like all Canadian citizens, are entitled to unemployment insurance, while 
Term 40 provides for old age pensions and Term 38 guarantees veterans’ ben-
efits (Newfoundland Act, 1949). While some terms, such as 28 and 29, provide 
for additional, albeit temporary, financial transfers on top of these other provi-
sions, the impetus behind the whole agreement was not to give Newfoundland 
guarantees that would “create significant differences between it and the exist-
ing provinces” (particularly the Maritimes), but to aid it in transitioning to a 
Canadian province (Blake, 2012: 49-50; May, 2003: 175; see also Mackenzie, 
1998: 233). Moreover, had the federal government wanted to give more bene-
ficial and long-lasting terms to Newfoundland, it would have been prevented 
from doing so by section 146 of the British North America Act (now the 
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Constitution Act, 1867), which requires that new provinces admitted to the 
federation be bound by the same constitutional conditions as every other prov-
ince (May, 2003: 174-75; MacKenzie, 1998: 233). Thus, promising to maintain 
a provincial transportation system in perpetuity would not be seen as meeting 
such conditions.
In light of this historical context the transfer of responsibility for operating 
the railway and the coastal ferry service to the government of Canada became 
governed under Term 31(a), which states: 
At the date of Union, or as soon thereafter as practicable, Canada will 
take over the following services and will as from the date of Union 
relieve the Province of Newfoundland of the public costs incurred in 
respect of each service taken over, namely,
(a) the Newfoundland Railway, including steamship and other 
marine services; . . . (Newfoundland Act, 1949)
A crucial component of Term 31(a) is that it decrees the financial responsibility 
of operating these services is to be incurred by Canada, not by the province. 
There were two rationales underpinning this transfer of financial liability. First, 
the railway and (to a smaller extent) the ferry service were largely responsible for 
the new province’s vast amount of debt incurred during the pre-Confederation 
years (Noel, 1971; Monahan, 1991: 855-56). Second, and congruently, there was 
a realization on the part of both governments that operating any modern trans-
portation system in Newfoundland with its “sparse and scattered population” 
would be a continuing costly endeavour (Blake, 1994: 17-18, 25). With a small 
tax base, little industry, and dependency on a handful of commodities whose 
prices were dictated by international circumstance, Newfoundland’s govern-
ment could not afford to maintain a modern transportation system for its 
growing population without federal relief (ibid., 26-27, 36). As such, for several 
decades until its abandonment in 1988, many of Newfoundland’s political leaders 
took the view that “[t]he implicit promise of the Terms of Union in rail matters 
was that special transportation infrastructure would be an ongoing commitment 
in light of Newfoundland’s unique needs” (Dunn, 2003b: 16). 
The problem with this latter perspective is that it regards the Terms of 
Union as a “treaty” or contract-like document, akin to the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms in its binding nature (O’Flaherty, 2009: 8). But, as a number of 
analysts have noted (Monahan, 1991; May, 2003; O’Flaherty, 2009), and indeed 
what the administrations of Premiers Peckford and Tobin would later conclude, 
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the Terms of Union, despite being a constitutional document, are not subject to 
the same rules of constitutional interpretation as, for example, the Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms. Generally, the Canadian Constitution is interpreted in a 
progressive way to ensure that its various components remain relevant to what-
ever the existing norms and practices of the day are. The Terms of Union, 
however, “when reviewed by Courts, have not been interpreted in a progres-
sive, liberal or broad manner” because they address specific issues (May, 2003: 
183).3 In legal analyst Stephen May’s words, the Terms “used precise language 
to identify specific obligations [while the] ‘progressive interpretation’ concept 
applies to general words in the constitution” (ibid.). Therefore, had a progres-
sive view been taken of the Terms they “could be stretched to force potentially 
unreasonable interpretations” (ibid.). This conclusion is further strengthened 
by the fact that no language in the Terms dictates how they should be interpreted, 
which “supports the contention that the Terms of Union were intended to have 
limited long-term relevance and utility” (ibid., 201). 
Given that Term 31(a) contains no wording decreeing that Canada would 
operate either the railway or the coastal ferry service indefinitely, it can only be 
assumed that the parties to the document realized that the federal government 
was under no legal obligation to maintain the service in perpetuity (ibid., 193). 
This was particularly noted during the 1948 negotiations when Newfound-
land’s delegates were recorded as having expressed concern over the fact that 
the Terms of Union did not “require the federal government to continue oper-
ating the Newfoundland Railway” (Monahan, 1991: 856; see also Blake, 2012: 
50). As such, the Term 31(a) use of the words “take over” implied “that the 
federal government would be in compliance with Term 31 as long as it ensured 
that the province did not have to assume any of the losses of the Newfoundland 
Railway” (Monahan, 1991: 856). Consequently, without “language that guar-
antees continued operation of or support for any of the services listed in Term 
31, their continued operation remains at the discretion of the Government of 
Canada” (May, 2003: 193; see also Monahan, 1991: 856).4
ROADS-FOR-RAILS
This ambiguity in the Terms of Union as to the status of the railway and coastal 
ferry created the flexibility needed for the 1988 and 1997 agreements to be 
made. The first of these agreements, the “Towards 2000: A Transportation Ini-
tiative for Newfoundland Labrador,” popularly known as the Roads-for-Rails 
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agreement, was signed on 20 June 1988, at the Radison Hotel in St. John’s. In 
exchange for an $800.6 million payment Newfoundland agreed to give up its 
claim that under Term 31(a) of the Terms of Union the federal government 
was required to operate a railway on the island. This was expressed in Article 
10(1) of the Roads-for-Rails agreement: 
[This agreement represents the] full satisfaction of all Canada’s consti-
tutional obligations related to railways on the Island of Newfound-
land, and Newfoundland acknowledges that these arrangements are 
made for such purpose, and accepts that when carried out and per-
formed in accordance with the provisions and intent of this Memoran-
dum of Understanding, they will represent a meeting, to the satisfaction 
of Canada’s constitutional obligations related to railways on the Island 
of Newfoundland. (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1988)
At that the time the railway was being managed by a subsidiary of the then 
federally owned Canadian National Railways (CN), Terra Transport. In ex-
change for giving up the railway Newfoundland would receive $740 million in 
highway infrastructure spending, including the building of 123 km of four-
lane highway, to be allocated over a 15-year period. The roughly 700 Terra 
Transport employees who would lose their jobs with the railway closure would 
in turn receive a separate severance package valued at $70 million while the 
railway towns of Bishop Falls and Port aux Basques would receive $15 million 
for economic development (ibid.). 
In many ways the railway’s closure in 1988 did not come as a surprise. 
Since its inception in 1881 the railway had always been a financial burden 
(Noel, 1971). Still, it was the primary — and until the building of the 
Trans-Canada Highway (TCH) in 1965, the only — mover of goods and peo-
ple across the island. But the inability to generate sufficient revenue would be 
the railway’s undoing, especially when it was forced to compete with alterna-
tive means of transportation. By 1969 CN and the federal government reached 
a deal with the province to abandon the trans-island passenger railway service 
in exchange for highway money and a CN bus service. But even the ability of 
the railway to dominate the freight sector began to collapse as increased com-
petition from trucks and container ships cut into CN’s market share. From 
1972 to 1976 CN saw its share of freight traffic decline from 87 per cent to 61 
per cent (Morris, 1977). In 1977, a joint provincial-federal Royal Commission, 
the Sullivan Commission, reviewed the province’s transportation system and 
NLS_Fall2012_2pp.indd   165 2013-04-30   5:06 PM
166  Collins  
concluded that the railway should be closed after a 10-year phase-down and a 
guarantee from the federal government that it would provide long-term high-
way funding (Collier, 2011).
However, the provincial governments of Progressive Conservative Pre-
miers Frank Moores (1972-79) and Brian Peckford (1979-89) refused to 
abandon the railway in the face of reports declaring that the line still had a 
future in the province as long as the federal government modernized it (Globe 
and Mail, 1978; Walters, 1979: 20-21). Peckford even went so far as to say, in 
1979, that the province was legally “not obliged to give up rails in order to get 
federal aid on roads” (ibid., 21). Despite the political rhetoric, however, CN 
was making it clear that it wanted to abandon the railway. The company’s local 
president and general manager, Ron Messenger, told an interviewer in 1981 
that the Terms of Union requiring federal ownership of the province’s railway 
were “so neutral that [they] really are of no advantage to either the federal or 
provincial governments” (Decks Awash, 1981: 47). The company argued that it 
was illogical to operate a railway in a province where every town served by 
train was also being served by road (Walters, 1979: 21). However, without con-
sent from the provincial government to agree to abandon the line the federal 
government invested an additional $77 million into a five-year railway revital-
ization plan in 1980 (Boone, 1987: 95). 
Despite this plan the railway’s market share continued to decline and the 
monetary losses mounted. By 1986 it was widely reported that discussions 
between the two governments towards reaching a deal on railway abandon-
ment had started (Truro Daily News, 1986). Crucially, 1986 saw the federal 
government deregulate Canada’s railways, at the time when both Canadian 
Pacific and Canadian National were required by law to service thousands of 
kilometres of unprofitable railway lines in rural areas, many of which were in 
Atlantic Canada (Forbes, 1993: 510; Crosbie, 1997: 286-87). The deregulation 
of the industry would allow the companies to pursue more profitable opera-
tions in other parts of the country, as was amply illustrated earlier in the year 
when Ottawa denied CN’s request for federal funding for a $5 billion expansion 
into western Canada. Notably, this rejection was based partially on the company’s 
continuing financial woes — specifically, the $40 million a year it lost on oper-
ating the Newfoundland railway. However, as the company was mandated 
under the Terms of Union to operate the railway, it could not unilaterally shut 
the line down (Daily Graphic, 1986). Coincidence or not, it is with this back-
drop that Peckford began facing pressure from the province’s federal represen-
tatives. First, Tory MP James McGrath told Peckford publicly to “stop dithering 
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on the subject [the railway] and strike a deal for improvement of the province’s 
highways, including turning the double lane TCH into a four lane route across 
the province” (Evening Telegram, 1986a). More importantly, however, the prov-
ince’s regional minister (and then federal Transport Minister), John Crosbie, 
went on the record declaring that the province needed to think more about the 
idea of a railway closure given the “deplorable” state of the province’s road system 
and of the “finances of the government of Canada” (Motor Truck, 1986). Nota-
bly, Crosbie’s comments came on top of news that Peckford had been offered 
upward of $1 billion in benefits from Ottawa to abandon the railway (ibid.). 
By June of 1986 Peckford was admitting that he was in negotiations with 
Crosbie and Deputy Prime Minister Mazankowski but that they had been of-
fering “unacceptable alternatives” (Evening Telegram, 1986b). Still, he declared 
that he was open to the idea of an acceptable offer assuming that the federal 
government met several conditions, including the provision of a “substantial 
amount of money” that would be used to make “significant improvements” to 
the TCH and secondary roads, in addition to a “fair chunk of change” to diver-
sify the economies of the railway towns of Port aux Basques, Corner Brook, 
Bishop Falls, and St. John’s (ibid.). But Peckford’s refusal to accept anything less 
than $1 billion for agreeing to abandon the railway led to an impasse. In response, 
the federal government announced a $36.4 million reprieve to keep the railway 
operating through 1987 (Yaffe, 1986; Edmonton Journal, 1986).
While these discussions were happening, the provincial Opposition Leader, 
Leo Barry, was issuing press releases calling on the provincial government not 
to be “blackmailed” into making “trade-offs for [the] Newfoundland railway” 
(Barry, 1986a). Barry included in his press releases quotes from Premier Peck-
ford affirming that the railway would stay, that the Newfoundland railway was 
a “sacred trust,” and that it was “a right under [the] Terms of Union with 
Canada and not linked with possible federal spending on needed highway 
improvements” (Barry, 1986b). Barry noted that “the Peckford Government 
has undergone a conversion of some strength on the [railway] issue” and had 
pointed out numerous instances when Peckford cabinet ministers called on 
federal MPs to reaffirm Canada’s constitutional obligation to operate a railway 
in the province (ibid.).5 Furthermore, Barry summarily tied those remarks to 
comments Peckford made on 6 May 1986 that “it is very, very dicey as to 
whether we could make these solemn promises [the Terms of Union] hold-up 
constitutionally in the Supreme Court of Canada” (ibid.).
Despite the ongoing negotiations and Opposition press releases, debates 
in the House of Assembly on railway abandonment were led by Opposition 
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members and not the government. An example of this occurred in March 1988 
when Transportation critic David Gilbert presented a private member’s motion 
arguing that the House of Assembly recognize the railway as a constitutional 
obligation; that the federal government “failed to properly discharge its consti-
tutional responsibility to maintain the Newfoundland railway”; and that the 
railway be shut down on the grounds that the federal government must meet a 
number of conditions including a new constitutional obligation that Ottawa 
“pay the capital cost of twinning the existing Trans Canada Highway across 
Newfoundland” (Hansard, 10 Mar. 1988: 39-40). Gilbert would also argue that 
the “most important matter” his motion raised was that the “rights guaranteed 
in Term 31(a) of the BNA Act, are not bartered away for a lump sum payment,” 
for such a move would only bring “short-term gain for long-term pain . . . [for 
what is] entrenched in the BNA Act is a guarantee that the federal government 
will pay for the cost of a transportation system for the Province of Newfound-
land” (Hansard, 16 Mar. 1988: 127-28).6 
Government response to the Opposition motions and questions was often 
in the form of denial. For example, Norm Doyle, the provincial Minister of 
Transportation, in response to Gilbert’s motion argued that there was no deal 
in place and that the province would not forfeit the rights “accorded New-
foundland under those Terms of Union” (ibid: 131, 136). Most notable during 
these debates in the months leading up to the agreement were Peckford’s com-
ments, particularly during Opposition questioning in late May 1988 when he 
declared that “our legal advisors and others, constitutional advisors, tell me we 
do not have a very strong constitutional or legal position” (Hansard, 31 May 
1988: 2475). He further responded that while no agreement was in place he 
had never denied having had negotiations with the federal government (Hansard, 
3 June 1988: 2661). 
One month after the deal had been signed an article in the Oshawa Times 
(Oosterom, 1988) summarized the agreement. The Times spoke of Premier 
Peckford’s 1979 train ride from Whitbourne to Bishop Falls, in which he rallied 
railway workers with the words, “This railway must be made to work and 
grow,” backed up by a verbal threat to take legal action to force CN to modern-
ize. As Oosterom noted, the 1988 Roads-for-Rails deal amounted to “a remark-
able about face” (ibid.). In regard to the Terms of Union, Oosterom wrote that 
Peckford had in previous times agreed that Term 31(a) meant “Ottawa [was] 
responsible for the costs of Newfoundland’s portion of the national transporta-
tion system,” but after declaring he had “done his homework” he decided that 
“court action was a waste of time” (ibid.)
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ROADS-FOR-BOATS
Unlike the Roads-for-Rails agreement, the coastal ferry transfer received less 
media coverage and near-zero public and legislative debate. Officially labelled 
the “Labrador Transportation Initiative,” the Roads-for-Boats agreement was 
signed on 3 April 1997. In exchange for not having to operate the Labrador 
coastal ferry service, as stipulated in Term 31(a), the federal government gave 
the province a $340 million lump-sum payment to be used for road construc-
tion. However, unlike the abandonment of the railway, the Labrador ferry service 
was transferred to the province. As such, a $150 million portion of the $340 
million payment was allocated for operating the ferry service in addition to the 
transfer of all assets. Similar to the railway deal, a separate severance package, 
worth $17 million, was provided to the estimated 250 employees laid off once 
the agreement came into effect. The remaining money, $190 million, was to be 
used to upgrade an existing highway between Churchill Falls and Happy 
Valley-Goose Bay, plus the building of additional roads that would connect 
several coastal Labrador towns to the main highway at Red Bay (Cleary, 1997: 1). 
Like the railway, the coastal ferries had become a necessary part of the 
province’s transportation infrastructure due to the lack of roads built during 
the pre-Confederation era. Importantly, as the marine services of the new 
province had been owned and operated largely by the railway, the federal gov-
ernment found itself, as per the conditions of Term 31(a), with the responsibility 
of servicing these routes. As the Labrador region lacked any sort of road or rail 
infrastructure, the coastal service remained a crucial lifeline for the many 
communities dotting its coast. Moreover, the service provided a continuous 
communication and economic link between Labrador and the island of New-
foundland. Although initially operated by CN, the marine service was trans-
ferred to another Crown corporation, Marine Atlantic, in 1986. 
The move towards ending federal involvement in the coastal ferry service 
began in the early 1990s. At that time Marine Atlantic was spending $25.5 mil-
lion a year on the Labrador coastal service in addition to the $30 million to $40 
million a year it used on the Newfoundland-to-Nova Scotia ferry service. None-
theless, the company was losing $4 million a year on the Labrador ferry as its 
usage declined and suffered competition from private air carriers (Doyle, 
1995: 8). During this period, public discussions began on transferring the ferry 
service to the province in exchange for road construction money (and the prom-
ise of hundreds of jobs with it) to complete the Trans-Labrador Highway (TLH) 
(MacKenzie, 1993). By 1994-95 Marine Atlantic was scaling back its services to 
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Labrador as both freight and passenger traffic continued to decline. Conse-
quently, local politicians and business groups, particularly from Liberal MP Bill 
Rompkey and the Labrador Transportation Committee (a collection of regional 
chambers of commerce), called for the provincial government of Liberal Pre-
mier Clyde Wells to make a deal similar to the 1988 Roads-for-Rails agreement 
and swap the ferry service for highway cash (Pomeroy, 1994; Doyle, 1995: 8).
By 1996 Wells resigned and was replaced by Brian Tobin, a popular federal 
Fisheries Minister and close associate of Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, who 
had made his mark in the turbot standoff with Spain the previous year (Harris, 
1998; Tobin, 2002; Goldenberg, 2006). After a few months in office Tobin’s 
government announced a “Labrador Transportation Initiative” (Bettney, 
1996). The document stated that negotiations between the federal and provin-
cial governments had already started “with a view towards developing a partner-
ship on the issue” before the year was out. Notably, the document concluded by 
arguing that highway development in Labrador could only proceed once the 
provincial government accepted responsibility for operating and maintaining 
the Labrador coastal services and support infrastructure in exchange for 
“sufficient” federal funds (ibid.). 
Following that announcement there would be no more news from either 
the government or the press on the Labrador Transportation Initiative until 
the day the deal was finalized in April 1997, during the Easter holiday. Like-
wise, there was no debate in the House of Assembly on this proposal in the 
lead-up to the announcement. In his speech during the signing Tobin declared 
that the agreement represented the “successful completion of negotiations 
between the province and Ottawa on the transfer of responsibility for [the] 
Labrador coastal boat service” (DWST, 1997). Tobin invoked the 1988 deal as 
the framework upon which the 1997 agreement had been made: “Just as in the 
Roads-for-Rails agreement, we intend to see that every dollar is used to build 
the TLH, and to maintain necessary ferry services in Labrador” (ibid.). 
ANALYSIS
The application of the Roads-for-Rails and Roads-for-Boats agreements to the 
theory of executive federalism provides further insight into the province’s rela-
tionship with its federal counterpart. First, regarding the role constitutional 
frameworks play in shaping policy discussions and results, the absence of any 
words on interpretation in the Terms of Union is of note. As detailed above, 
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this absence created enough ambiguity for both governments to agree that 
Ottawa did not have to operate the trains and boats in perpetuity. In his 1983 
personal manifesto, The Past in the Present, Premier Peckford seems to have 
tacitly acknowledged this fact when he stated that the federal obligation under 
the Terms of Union was simply to maintain the railway and that changes could 
only occur with the “consent of both parties” (Peckford, 1983: 75-76). Premier 
Tobin, however, in his own personal reflections on the Roads-for-Boats agree-
ment, indicates that the federal government “was committed under a constitu-
tional agreement to maintain the service in perpetuity” (Tobin, 2002: 201). 
Regardless of his dubious explanation, the reality is that the Terms governed 
the type of deals that would emerge; for although there was no wording requir-
ing a permanent federal obligation to operate the trains and boats, Ottawa 
could never unilaterally withdraw its support from these services. 
With the railway and coastal ferry service being maintained under the 
mandate in Term 31(a), the province had to be financially relieved from operat-
ing its trains and boats. Therefore, the federal government was implicitly bound 
to provide monetary compensation to Newfoundland upon agreeing to aban-
don the railway and transferring the coastal ferry. This point is amply demon-
strated in Peckford’s comments during the signing of the ‘Roads-for-Rails’ deal:
We have assessed the legal intent and obligations imposed on the fed-
eral government by the Terms of Union. It is clear that the Government 
of Canada does not have a legal obligation to operate a railway in New-
foundland forever. We have always felt, however, that the federal govern-
ment does have an obligation to ensure that there is a viable transportation 
system in this province. This agreement today constitutes our mutual 
recognition that this comprehensive transportation package meets that 
obligation. (Cited in Monahan, 1991: 867; author’s emphasis) 
Premier Tobin, in his own memoirs, echoes a similar tone:
We approached Ottawa with a proposal: instead of providing the inad-
equate seasonal ferry service year after year, Newfoundland would 
build a coastal highway serving the same communities. The province 
would release Ottawa from its constitutional obligation to operate the 
ferry service in return for the transfer of a one-time-only lump sum of 
money to Newfoundland to pay for the road construction. (Tobin, 
2002: 201)
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In this sense the 1988 and 1997 agreements can be said to represent exam-
ples of what Simeon (2006) referred to as “de-facto constitutional” changes; 
there was ambiguity in a constitutional provision — namely, how to end federal 
involvement in Newfoundland’s transportation sector — so both levels of 
government agreed to an alternative: swap the services for lump-sum cash 
payments. In this regard, both agreements reinforce O’Flaherty’s (2009: 9) 
statement that the Terms of Union “can govern the overall behaviour and pol-
icy development between federal and provincial governments.” In addition, 
these agreements highlight the fact that, now, the purpose of the Terms are to 
serve as a “means to an end for policy development and resource allocation,” 
given that original raison d’être of the Terms — that Newfoundland be incor-
porated as a Canadian province — has been completed (ibid., 10). Finally, in 
regard to the legality of these agreements, while it is a basic principle of consti-
tutional law “that one government cannot bind another to a decision without a 
constitutional amendment,” this ignores the fact that the “federal government 
has never been under a constitutional obligation to maintain or operate the 
Newfoundland railway...The absence of any requirement to maintain the ser-
vice means that there is no constitutional objection to a decision” to close 
down the railway and transfer the coastal ferry service (Monahan, 1991: 867).
In a similar vein, the use of an “agreement” to get around constitutional 
ambiguity points to Cameron and Simeon’s (2002) collaborative federalism 
sub-theory of executive federalism. While these authors suggest that collabo-
rative federalism began as a response to deep federal cuts in the 1990s, the 
cases examined in this paper suggest that this form of policy-making occurred 
as early as the mid-1980s with the Mulroney government’s deregulation of the 
transportation sector — before the Chrétien government’s “secondary down-
loading” of federal services to the provinces in the 1990s. In both the 1988 and 
1997 agreements the province was left with a greater degree of responsibility 
for maintaining its own transportation network, particularly its highways. 
Likewise, these cases point to an earlier observation in this paper on the inter-
section of national policy goals — deregulation and deficit cuts — with a 
constitutional stricture that can result in a de facto constitutional change. 
Moreover, and especially in regard to the railway, this form of agreement also 
allowed both parties to avoid a costly court challenge. This much was admitted 
by Peckford during his debate with Opposition Leader Leo Barry in 1986, 
when he stated that it would be “very, very dicey as to whether we could make 
these solemn promises hold-up constitutionally in the Supreme Court of Canada” 
(6 May 1986).7
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Savoie’s description of “court government” is also worth mentioning. As 
Savoie (1999: 639) notes, Chrétien was known to have preferred dealing with 
premiers one on one, bypassing and, indeed, often sidelining his own appointed 
regional ministers. Chrétien and Tobin had a close relationship, given the latter’s 
performance in cabinet as Fisheries Minister during the PM’s first term (Harris, 
1998; Goldenberg, 2006). As such, Tobin would often negotiate directly with the 
PM and the PMO rather than through the province’s regional minister, Fred 
Mifflin. While Tobin, in his memoirs, does not mention specifically asking the 
PM or his advisers about negotiating the Roads-for-Boats deal, he does discuss 
having negotiated with Ottawa directly, with no mention of Mifflin as part of the 
conversation (Tobin, 2002). If additional experiences are worth anything, it is 
notable that in 1998, a year after the boat deal, Tobin was appealing “directly to 
Chrétien, rather than Pierre Pettigrew — the relevant minister at the time — to 
speed up the post-TAGS (The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy) planning and in-
crease the [federal] financial contribution.” Neither the cabinet nor the Finance 
Minister, Paul Martin, was consulted on these changes (ibid., 640). 
The opposite was true in the 1988 Roads-for-Rails deal. In that case John 
Crosbie, the federal Transport Minister and regional minister for the province, 
dealt directly with Peckford on behalf of Ottawa, a role he carried out through-
out his term in Mulroney’s cabinet no matter what department he led. As such, 
at one level, these two agreements highlight how more subjective factors, first 
identified by Bakvis (1991), can shape the roles regional ministers play in 
federal-provincial relations. For one, some ministers become “unusually 
prominent because they have both the will and the capacity to cultivate the role 
of regional spokesperson,” as was the case with Crosbie and Tobin. Second, 
there is the “broader role played by the Prime Minister . . . [as] the Prime 
Minister determines the allocation of portfolios to individuals” (ibid., 288-89). 
However, the PM is always “constrained by what the election results bring 
forward in the way of raw material, particularly from the regions,” and “the 
material is often far from adequate” (ibid.). Thus, the inference that can be 
made from the 1997 deal is that Mifflin, with a much “smaller-than-life” per-
sonality and a smaller pedestal (Veterans’ Affairs versus Transportation and 
Fisheries and Oceans), played a more minor (indeed, if any) role in federal- 
provincial relations during Tobin’s tenure as Premier.
Finally, Menzies’s (2012) summary of the often “closed-door” nature of 
executive federalism is evident in the two cases examined in this paper. With 
both agreements the provincial Opposition and, more importantly, the public 
were largely kept in the dark on the federal-provincial discussions leading up 
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to the deal. This was particularly noteworthy with the Roads-for-Boats agree-
ment, which warranted no attention in the House of Assembly by the Opposi-
tion and for which discussions largely occurred out of the limelight of the 
media (it was also unveiled over the Easter weekend, when the House was not 
in session and the public’s attention was directed elsewhere). While it is true 
that such agreements lack decision-making rules and transparency, Menzies 
(ibid., 2) argues that the public expects its political leaders to work around 
constitutional constraints. In both cases, public opposition was mute once the 
agreements were made. But with most Newfoundlanders and Labradorians 
commuting by car (especially after the building of the TCH in 1965), there has 
been, and always is, a desire — as in most other jurisdictions — for more govern-
ment investment in road infrastructure. This was particularly demonstrated in 
Labrador by the advent of a grassroots advocacy group calling on the provincial 
government to exchange the ferry service for Trans-Labrador Highway money. 
It was also notable in Prince Edward Island when that province, with federal 
agreement, determined to give up its railway and the ferry service to New 
Brunswick for a permanent fixed link.
CONCLUSION
The Roads-for-Rails and Roads-for-Boats cases demonstrate that much potential 
exists for further research on executive federalism in the province regarding a 
variety of issues and services, particularly natural resources such as oil and gas, 
hydroelectricity, and the fishery. An examination of executive federalism sur-
rounding the Churchill Falls agreement in the 1960s, building upon the work 
of Jason Churchill (1999), and in relation to the Atlantic Accord, in 1985 and 
2005, would be particularly valuable from a comparative perspective, particu-
larly in light of today’s debates surrounding the Muskrat Falls hydro devel-
opment. Moreover, a comparison with PEI’s deal with Ottawa to abandon its 
railway and ferry for a fixed link, the Confederation Bridge, would also repre-
sent a fitting comparative study with Newfoundland’s agreements. 
However, given the 1988 and 1997 deals, it is worth asking what the future is 
for the one remaining federally operated transportation service in the province 
still mandated under the Terms of Union: the Nova Scotia-Newfoundland ferry 
service. While mandated under Term 32, instead of Term 31, the ferry is ostensi-
bly protected on the wording that “Canada will maintain [author’s emphasis] in 
accordance with the traffic offering a freight and passenger steamship service 
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between North Sydney and Port aux Basques,” a phrase that was never included 
in the Term covering the railway and coastal ferry (May, 2003). Still, this did not 
stop Premier Tobin, during a Marine Atlantic labour dispute with Ottawa in 
1999, from publicly positing that the federal government should transfer the Gulf 
ferry service to the province in exchange for a one-time cash payment (“we 
would need a very substantial dollar sum upon the table,” Tobin was reported to 
have said) (Sweet, 1999: 1). The resulting public backlash in the press over this 
issue saw Tobin backtrack from his comments, but nevertheless this example 
may point to another issue worth examining: the role of what wider civic society 
may see as an important public interest and how this may impede or facilitate 
executive federalism. If there is a demand for a certain service or arrangement 
(such as new highways or better roads), then the public will be more likely to let 
its political leaders, as Menzies (2012) suggests, work around constitutional stric-
tures in order to make effective deals (as can be demonstrated with the Roads-
for-Rails and Roads-for-Boats deals). However, if a proposed deal involves an 
agreement that could possibly alter a service or provision mandated under a cer-
tain constitutional document that the public largely holds in high value, then 
there will be little support for a deal brokered through executive federalism.
Again, these questions point to the fact that much research remains to be 
done on executive federalism within a Newfoundland and Labrador context. 
While this paper has provided a political science perspective on two such 
agreements, more research is required to identify what trends and dissimilari-
ties exist in such arrangements and what this means for the province’s place in 
the Canadian federation.
NOTES
1 Special thanks to Scott Reid for his encouragement, helpful suggestions, and insight. 
Additional thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their input, and to Jenny Mason for 
her love and support.
2 For the sake of simplicity, Newfoundland and Labrador will henceforth be referred to 
as Newfoundland.
3 Most crucial were cases brought before the Federal Court and the Supreme Court of 
Canada in respect to the PEI and BC Terms of Union. In both cases, BC (AG) v. Canada 
(AG), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 41 and PEI (Minister of Transportation and Public Works) v. Cana-
dian National Railway Co., [1991] 1 F.C. 129, the respective courts ruled, on the basis of 
a strict interpretation of each province’s Terms of Union, that the federal government 
was not obligated to operate a railway in either province in perpetuity.
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4 Also noteworthy, as cited by Monahan (1991: 858), is the 1949 federal Order-in-Council 
authorizing Canadian National to “operate the railway on condition that ‘such manage-
ment and operation shall continue during the pleasure of the Governor in Council and 
be subject to termination or variation from time to time in whole or in part by the Gov-
ernor in Council.’” Thus, in Monahan’s words, “The absence of any such requirement in 
the 1949 Order in Council indicates that the government of the day did not believe that 
it had any constitutional obligation to ensure the perpetual operation of the railway.”
5 Of particular interest, Barry highlights a letter written by Education Minister Lynn 
Verge to then MP Brian Tobin on 22 April 1981 asking, “Will the Federal Government 
honour its promise to Newfoundland at the time of Confederation, set out in Terms 31 
and 32 of the Terms of Union, assuring the operation of the Newfoundland Railway 
and the subsidy of the Port aux Basques-North Sydney Gulf crossing?”
6 The BNA Act, 1949 (see References, under British North America Act) and the New-
foundland Act, 1949 are different names for the same enactment that brought Newfound-
land into Confederation.
7 Of interest in this context are Peckford’s previous failures, in the early 1980s, at using 
court challenges over the Churchill Falls contract and offshore oil jurisdictional claims.
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